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Abstract 
This paper investigates the influence of institutional quality on 
innovation performance in developing countries by employing 
annual data from 1997-2014. The system- generalized method of 
moments (GMM) is used as the empirical method. Estimation results 
reveal that bureaucratic quality, government stability, democratic 
accountability and law and order indicators that represent 
institutional quality are a positive influence on innovation 
performance. These results indicate that improving the institutional 
structure in the developing countries will have a significant 
contribution to the innovation process and hence economic 
development. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation promotes productivity in a country, provides a significant 
competitive advantage and is widely accepted as a driving force for long-
term economic growth (Barasa etal., 2014; Laboutkova, 2013). The inclusion 
of technology as a constant in growth models proves the importance of 
innovation (Boudreaux, 2017). In addition, there is evidence in the literature 
that innovation is a major influence on cross-country differences in income 
or growth rates (Hall, 1994; Freeman, 2002). For this reason, it is very 
important to design growth policies to show which factors determine the 
innovation in developed and especially developing countries. Until recently, 
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literature has focused on the impact of innovation on economic growth and 
factors such as foreign direct investment, trade openness and human capital 
as determinants of innovation. But there is little debate about the impact of 
institutions on innovation. Moreover, country experience has shown that 
different innovation performances may arise in countries with similar 
technology, labour and capital resources. As an important reason for this 
situation, the institutional environment differences between countries are 
shown (Lee and Law, 2016). Therefore, there has recently been an increased 
interest in research on institutions-innovation relations. 
 
According to theoretical explanations, countries with strong institutions have 
a democratic regime, independent legal system, functioning state mechanism 
or bureaucratic structure and public confidence. Such an environment 
provides the following benefits: (1) Uncertainties are reduced. (2) 
Commercial relations and contracts occur in a trusting environment. (3) 
Property rights are guaranteed. (4) Market mechanism works more 
effectively. (5) Free competition environment is provided. (6) Transaction 
costs are reduced for all economic actors. Thanks to these benefits, 
entrepreneurs make the best use of their talents. They are more willing to use 
new methods in production. They make more inventions. As a result of these 
efforts, they obtain important returns and protect the product of their effort 
through property rights. Ultimately, research and development investments 
increase and more innovation occurs in overall economic life (Gould and 
Gruben, 1996; Acemoğlu etal., 2003). In addition, it is emphasized that 
physical capital, human capital and technology are very important for 
economic development according to the literature, but it is also added that 
these important factors are not successful in the absence of strong institutions 
that provide incentives and supports (Eicher and Garcia-Pealosa, 2006). 
 
This paper presents an empirical test on the impact of institutional quality on 
innovation. In this context, the impact of institutional indicators on 
innovation performance in developing countries is investigated empirically. 
The paper contributes to the literature in two respects. Firstly, most of the 
empirical investigations in this area examine developed countries (Tolbert 
etal., 2008; Égert, 2016), but there are limited findings for developing 
countries (Barasa etal., 2014). This study contributes to the literature by 
providing empirical findings for developing countries. Second, the system-
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is used in the study. This method has significant advantages 
over other methods (OLS, pooled OLS, fixed effect, random effect) These 
advantages are: (a) Method reveals dynamic relationships between economic 
variables. (b) It also solves the problem of endogeneity and autocorrelation 
by using the instrument variable. For this reason, it produces more reliable 
and effective results than other estimators. It should also be noted that more 
effective findings will help authorities to design policies. 
 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 specifies the 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains findings. 
Section 5 summarizes the findings and provides suggestions. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
In this study, a dynamic panel data model is estimated as follows: 
 
Yit = δ1Yit -1 + δ2 Xit + δ′Zit + γi + εit                 (1) 
 
i= 1,2,3,…,N and t =1,2,3,…,T 
 
Where Y, X, Z, γ and ε represent dependent variable, explanatory variables, 
control / addition variables, unobservable country specific effects and error 
term, respectively. δ denotes the coefficient parameters to be estimated. The 
standard estimators used for the estimation of Eq. (1) produce biased and 
inconsistent results. Because adding the lagged values of the dependent 
variable to the estimation model as the explanatory variable causes some 
econometric problems. The first of these problems is that the lagged variable 
(Yit-1) is correlated with the error term. This leads to the problem of 
autocorrelation. Second, the correlation between country-specific effects and 
explanatory variables can lead to the problem of endogeneity. 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a difference-GMM method to solve these 
problems. The difference-GMM method applies the econometric model to 
the first difference transform and all lagged variables are used as the 
instruments variable. Thus, the econometric problems cease to exist and the 
country-specific effects in equation (1) are eliminated. Equation (2) 
represents this process. 
 
∆Yit = δ1 ∆Yit -1 + δ2 ∆Xit + δ′∆Zit + uit                      (2) 
 
uit= eit-eit-1  
 
Conversely, if the explanatory variables are persistent over time, the lagged 
levels of these variables can be very weak instruments for the first 
differences. This limitation of the difference-GMM method may cause 
estimators to be biased and inconsistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose the system-GMM method to reduce the 
likelihood of biased and inconsistent in the difference-GMM method. The 
system-GMM approach deals with the difference and level equations 
together so that the estimator becomes more efficient. 
 
The performance of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of the two 
assumptions. First, there should not be second-order autocorrelation even if 
there is first-order autocorrelation among the error terms in the model. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test the null hypothesis "no autocorrelation" with 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests for the residuals of the first difference model. AR(1) 
and AR(2) determine whether there is autocorrelation in first-order and 
second-order respectively. The second is the assumption that the 
instrumental variables are valid. The validity of this hypothesis is 
investigated by the Sargan (Hansen-J statistic) test. The Sargan test examines 
the null hypothesis that "instrumental variables are valid". Ultimately, the 
null hypothesis is decided on the basis of the statistical significance of the 
test result. 
 
3. Data 
 
This paper uses a cross-country panel data of 23 developing countries 
(Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa and 
Turkey). The data are annual and cover the period 1997-2014. The dependent 
variable is innovation and is represented by the total patent application. The 
explanatory variables representing institutional quality are bureaucratic 
quality, government stability, democratic accountability and law and order. 
Other explanatory variables added to the model to increase the reliability of 
estimation results are economic growth, trade, foreign direct investment and 
credit. The natural logarithms of all variables are taken. Table 1 summarizes 
the explanations for all variables. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of variables and data sources 
 
Variable Unit Source Definition 
Innovation Number of 
thousand 
applications 
World 
Intellectual 
Property 
Organization 
Innovation is measured by the 
total number of patent 
applications. 
(residents and non-residents) 
Economic 
growth 
US$ 
 
World Bank GDP per capita (Constant 2010) 
Trade Percent (%) World Bank Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of GDP. 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Percent (%) World Bank Foreign direct investment is net 
foreign capital inflows as a share 
of GDP. 
Private sector 
credit 
Percent (%) World Bank Private sector credit is 
represented by domestic credits 
to the private sector. (As a share 
of GDP). 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
Index  
(between 0-4) 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
(ICRG) 
Bureaucratic quality is measured 
by the bureaucracy's political 
repression immunity and power 
of domination. The increase in 
the index score indicates 
bureaucratic quality 
improvement. 
Government 
stability 
Index  
(between 0-
12) 
ICRG Government stability measures 
the government’s ability to carry 
out its announced program and 
its ability to stay in office. The 
increase in the index score 
indicates government stability 
improvement. 
Democratic 
accountability 
Index  
(between 0-6) 
ICRG Democratic accountability is a 
measure of the level of 
government sensitivity to its 
people. The increase in the index 
score indicates democratic 
accountability improvement. 
Law and 
Order 
Index  
(between 0-6) 
ICRG Law and order measure the 
impartiality of the legal system 
and the influence of the legal 
system on the people. The 
increase in the index score 
indicates law and order 
improvement. 
Note: The table is prepared by the author. 
4. Estimation results 
 
Table 2 illustrates the difference and system-GMM estimations results for 
institutional quality indicators. Columns (1-2), (3-4), (5-6) and (7-8) explain 
the effect of bureaucratic quality, government stability, democratic 
accountability and law and order on innovation, respectively. The difference 
and system-GMM estimations results show that institutional quality 
indicators have a positive and significant effect on innovation performance. 
In other words, institutional developments in developing countries have an 
increasing influence on patent applications. In addition, coefficient estimates 
of other explanatory variables (economic growth, trade, foreign direct 
investment and private sector credit) added to the model are also 
considerably in line with the economic expectations. As emphasized earlier, 
the effectiveness of the GMM estimators depends on the validity of the two 
assumptions. Hansen and second-order autocorrelation tests show the 
validity of these assumptions. Firstly, the Hansen test results for all estimated 
models reveal that the instruments are valid. Secondly, AR(2) test results 
indicate that there is no second order autocorrelation. 
 
Table 2: Baseline results (1997-2014) 
 
Dependent variable:  
Innovation as total patent application 
 
Independent 
variables 
Diff-
GMM 
(1) 
Sys-
GMM 
(2) 
Diff-
GMM 
(3) 
Sys-
GMM 
(4) 
Diff-
GMM 
(5) 
Sys-
GMM 
(6) 
Diff-
GMM 
(7) 
Sys-
GMM 
(8) 
 
Innovation  
(t-1) 
0.14* 
(0.00) 
0.39* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.82) 
0.36* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.81) 
0.37* 
(0.00) 
0.16* 
(0.00) 
0.41* 
(0.00) 
 
Economic 
growth 
0.34 
(0.24) 
0.66* 
(0.00) 
0.89* 
(0.00) 
0.83* 
(0.00) 
0.86* 
(0.00) 
0.81* 
(0.00) 
0.92* 
(0.00) 
0.63* 
(0.00) 
 
Trade  0.43* 
(0.00) 
0.21** 
(0.03) 
0.54** 
(0.01) 
0.20** 
(0.04) 
0.56** 
(0.01) 
0.21** 
(0.04) 
0.56* 
(0.00) 
0.20** 
(0.04) 
 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
0.06 
(0.71) 
0.10* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
0.09* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.60) 
0.09* 
(0.00) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.09* 
(0.00) 
 
Private 
sector credit 
0.53* 
(0.00) 
0.11** 
(0.02) 
0.57* 
(0.00) 
0.11* 
(0.00) 
0.60* 
(0.00) 
0.11* 
(0.00) 
0.26* 
(0.00) 
0.09** 
(0.01) 
 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
0.28* 
(0.00) 
0.22* 
(0.00) 
       
Government 
stability 
  0.41* 
(0.00) 
0.19** 
(0.02) 
     
Democratic 
Acc. 
    0.85* 
(0.00) 
0.33** 
(0.03) 
   
Law and  
Order 
      0.26* 
(0.00) 
0.03* 
(0.00) 
 
#Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23  
Hansen  
J-test 
19.68 20.64 17.92 19.97 18.03 20.20 20.62 21.49  
Hansen  
p-value 
0.29 0.24 0.39 0.27 0.38 0.26 0.24 0.20  
AR(2)  
test 
-1.14 -1.50 -0.78 -0.76 -1.14 -0.75 -1.57 -1.30  
AR(2)  
p-value 
0.35 0.13 0.44 0.44 0.35 0.45 0.11 0.19  
 
Notes: (a) P-values are indicated in parentheses.  
(b) *, ** denote significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 
Finally, in order to check robustness, analysis is repeated with an alternative 
innovation indicator. For this purpose, the number of industrial design 
registration applications is considered as an indication of innovation. Data is 
obtained from World Intellectual Property Organization for 22 countries 
from 2000-2014. Table 3 illustrates the estimation results for robustness 
check. Accordingly, estimation results obtained for industrial design as an 
alternative innovation indicator support baseline findings. The robust control 
findings show that improvements in institutional quality have a positive 
effect on industrial design registration applications. The Hansen and AR(2) 
test results show that the instruments are valid and there is no second-order 
autocorrelation in the estimated models. 
 
Table 3: Robustness check results 
 
Dependent variable:  
Innovation as total Industrial design application 
Independent 
variables 
Diff-
GMM 
(1) 
Sys-
GMM 
(2) 
Diff-
GMM 
(3) 
Sys-
GMM 
(4) 
Diff-
GMM 
(5) 
Sys-
GMM 
(6) 
Diff-
GMM 
(7) 
Sys-
GMM 
(8) 
Innovation  
(t-1) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
0.58* 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
0.63* 
(0.00) 
0.08*** 
(0.06) 
0.63* 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.71) 
0.68* 
(0.00) 
Economic 
growth 
1.39* 
(0.00) 
0.63* 
(0.00) 
1.25* 
(0.00) 
0.65* 
(0.00) 
1.58* 
(0.00) 
0.64* 
(0.00) 
1.32* 
(0.00) 
0.43* 
(0.00) 
Trade  0.67* 
(0.00) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.38* 
(0.00) 
0.11* 
(0.00) 
0.37** 
(0.01) 
0.17* 
(0.00) 
0.66* 
(0.00) 
0.13* 
(0.00) 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
0.10 
(0.85) 
0.005 
(0.74) 
0.024 
(0.10) 
0.03** 
(0.02) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.03* 
(0.00) 
0.05* 
(0.00) 
0.07* 
(0.00) 
Private 
sector credit 
0.05 
(0.81) 
0.29 
(0.35) 
0.09 
(0.51) 
0.25* 
(0.01) 
0.008** 
(0.04) 
0.25** 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.14*** 
(0.08) 
      
Government 
stability 
  0.14** 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.07) 
    
Democratic 
Acc. 
    0.24* 
(0.00) 
0.22** 
(0.03) 
  
Law and  
Order 
      0.40* 
(0.00) 
0.23* 
(0.00) 
#Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Hansen  
J-test 
25.02 21.25 15.60 20.59 16.63 20.65 21.24 18.87 
Hansen  
p-value 
0.10 0.14 0.48 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.16 0.28 
AR(2)  
test 
-0.57 -1.00 -0.97 -0.89 -1.05 -1.26 -1.05 -1.43 
AR(2)  
p-value 
0.56 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.15 
Notes: (a) P-values are indicated in parentheses.  
(b) *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this study, the influence of institutional quality on innovation in 23 
developing countries of 1997-2014 period was investigated by system-GMM 
method. The results of the analysis show that the institutional quality is a 
strong influence on the innovation performance. These results provide 
empirical evidence on relevant literature about the importance of institutions 
in the innovation process for developing countries. The basic 
recommendation of working within this context is that, while preparing 
economic growth and innovation incentive policies, a strong institutional 
environment must first be provided. Otherwise, incentive policies will only 
yield short-term results, and there will be no meaningful change in the long-
term. 
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